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In September,  1986, the United States joined the 92 members of the
General  Agreement  on Tariffs  and Trade  (commonly referred  to as
the GATT) in launching the eighth round of multilateral  trade nego-
tiations.  (Formerly, agriculture  has been off to the side  of the GATT
negotiations.)  With agricultural trade tensions at a post war high, a
number of GATT  member governments  want agriculture  fast,  front
and center.
Negotiations:  Critical and Next  to Impossible
But wanting doesn't make it so.  Despite the desires  of the United
States  and other countries to deal with agriculture  in this round of
talks,  U.S.  agriculture  finds itself in a position where  international
negotiations  are all but critical and next to impossible.
Negotiations  are  crucial  because  over  the  past  fifteen  years the
fortunes  of U.S.  agriculture have  become  inextricably  linked to the
international  market.  At the height  of the export boom,  two out of
every five acres in the United States were planted for export, exports
generated  more than 30  percent  of U.S.  agriculture's  cash  receipts,
and  U.S.  agriculture  prospered.  The  sharp  decline  in exports  since
1981 has thrown U.S. agriculture  into a tailspin. Agriculture's prob-
lems have their root in the international economy,  and the solutions
must be sought there.
But, prevailing  conditions  make international  negotiations  in the
GATT  next  to  impossible.  Agricultural  surpluses  are  at historical
highs and are likely to continue increasing. Demand for agricultural
imports is sluggish. Exporting countries have been forced into subsi-
dizing exports to defend old and acquire new markets.  Domestic agri-
cultural policies and problems are spilling over into the international
economy,  wreaking  havoc  with international  trading relations.  The
situation calls  for talking in  organizations  like the  GATT through
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seems to be yelling  about unfair trade practices and predatory  poli-
cies.
GATT: The Only Negotiating  Forum
Before  going further  it is perhaps  useful  to explain  the  GATT-a
mystery wrapped in an enigma even to those who know it well. The
GATT is an interim committee to an organization that does not exist.
That organization-the  International Trade Organization (ITO)-was
proposed  by the United States  at the time  of the Bretton Woods  ac-
cords.  It was to be  the third  leg of the international  organizational
stool-the International Monetary  Fund (IMF) for finance; the World
Bank for development  and the International  Trade Organization  for
trade.  The  ITO  was  to promote  trade  liberalization  and expansion
and  to  police  market  arrangements.  Congress,  unwilling  to  relin-
quish power  over  domestic  policy  to  an  international  organization,
vetoed the ITO. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, then,
grew  out  of the remains  of the  ITO. It expresses  the  sentiments  of
trade  liberalization,  but provides  for  an  ineffective  dispute  settle-
ment  procedure  without  enforcement  powers.  However,  for  all  its
warts, the GATT is the only multilateral trade organization  we have
and  its  rules  are  respected,  if not  in  the  observance  then  in  the
breach.
The original  drafters  of the  GATT did not exclude or exempt agri-
culture from trade liberalization.  But the United States, by virtue of
being the largest agricultural producer and the most politically pow-
erful  member  of the  GATT,  was  able  to  obtain  the  now  infamous
Section 22 waiver.  The Section 22 waiver allows the United States to
set  import  quotas  if imports  threaten  the  government's  ability  to
carry  out certain  domestic  commodity  programs  (such as the dairy
and  sugar  programs).  The  United  States was  also  instrumental  in
excluding agriculture  from rules prohibiting export subsidies.
In the post  World  War  II period,  when  the  United  States  sought
these exceptions and exclusions,  and even though U.S. trade policies
were hostile to the spirit of the GATT and required special treatment,
they did not impose heavy costs on other countries and thus did not
incense our trading partners.
Surplus Disposal  Policies  Do Not Work Well
In the 1950s and 1960s, U.S.  agriculture was characterized  by sur-
pluses,  low  prices  and significant  acreage  reduction  programs.  The
United  States  disposed  of those  surpluses  onto  the  world  market
through  the Food  for  Peace  program  (PL-480)  and through  export
subsidies.
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In those years exports accounted  for a relatively  small proportion of
U.S. agricultural production, but relative to world trade, U.S. exports
were  quite large.  The United  States had few competitors  who could
meet or beat our prices-subsidized or not. At that time Europe was
recovering  from the war  and  was not  self-sufficient  in  agricultural
products. The continent provided an important market for subsidized
U.S. grain. Few developing countries produced wheat and feed grains
in  sufficient  quantities  for  export  and a  number  relied  on PL-480
shipments.
The  present  situation  of U.S.  agriculture  is,  in  some  ways,  quite
similar to that of the late 1950s and the 1960s. U.S. domestic policies
have encouraged the accumulation  of huge surpluses, the 1985  Food
Security  Act calls  for  low prices  and drastic acreage  reduction  pro-
grams.
But  the  situation  is  also  quite  different  primarily  because  the
world  is  different.  U.S.  agriculture  depends  much more  heavily  on
the  export  market  than it  did  in the  1950s  and  1960s.  And  that
export market is no longer ours to dominate.  Technology flows more
rapidly across national borders and productive capacity and competi-
tion are  increasing. A number  of countries  have joined  the United
States as major exporters and their agricultural  policies  are impor-
tant to the United States.
Agriculture is also more integrated into the general  domestic econ-
omy.  The sector's  dependence  on capital investment  and purchased
inputs and services make inflation and interest rates important.  Ag-
riculture  is  also  more  integrated  into  the  international  economy
through its dependence on trade. Thus, exchange rates, international
capital  flows,  foreign countries'  agricultural  policies, and worldwide
economic  growth will now determine agriculture's fortunes.
Low  prices  and  subsidies  will  not  buy back  U.S.  prosperity.  The
export  enhancement  program  and  marketing  loans  might  have
worked  well in the  1950s and  1960s but they will  fail miserably  in
the 1980s.  In fact, they are likely to incite  a trade riot.
1970s Export Boom  Not Likely to Repeat
The  United States  can no  longer  afford  to take  comfort  in those
GATT exclusions and exceptions it negotiated after the war. The con-
ditions  that fueled  the export  boom of the  1970s  will  not likely be
repeated;  the  United  States  is  no  longer  the  dominant  exporting
country;  and domestic agricultural  policies  impose huge costs  across
borders.  Without  negotiations,  the current  agricultural  crisis could
deteriorate into an agricultural cataclysm.
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ence  of circumstances  that  are  not  likely to  be  repeated.  Between
1940 and  1972,  U.S.  exports rose  steadily,  increasing  at an annual
rate of $400 million (in 1985 dollars), based on growth in population
and per capita income.  Then in  1973,  policy changes  abroad and in
the  United  States  fueled  export  growth  and  sent  shock  waves
through  U.S.  agriculture's  export  markets  that  would  reverberate
throughout  the decade.  That year,  U.S.  exports jumped  $5.7 billion
(in 1985 dollars) and continued to increase through 1981 at five times
the historical rate (Rossmiller  1986a).
The  Soviet Union  decided to buy  grain  on the  world  market,  in-
creasing  U.S.  exports  by  8  million  metric  tons  in  one  year  alone.
More important for the longer term was OPEC's quadrupling  of the
price  of oil,  leading  to  a tremendous  increase  in  petrodollars  and
international  liquidity.
Those petrodollars were transferred from developed countries to de-
veloping countries,  recycled through the international  banking sys-
tem. Developing countries were encouraged by low real interest rates
to borrow from the banks. Commercial bank lending to the develop-
ing countries increased approximately  20 percent annually through-
out  much  of the  decade.  The  borrowed  capital  allowed  developing
countries  to more  than proportionately  increase  their imports from
the United States over the decade.
The United States made some policy changes that affected agricul-
ture  as  well.  In  1973  the  United  States  had  decided  it  would  no
longer be  the world's macroeconomic  thermostat and suspended the
convertibility  of the dollar.  With the move from fixed to floating ex-
change rates, the value  of the dollar fell and import prices began to
fluctuate with the changing relative prices of international  monies.
The United States, like other developed countries, responded to the
OPEC price increase by inflating its economy, leading to low interest
rates, high inflation and high growth.  High rates of economic growth
contributed to the export boom.  Annual  growth  rates of 3.5 percent
in the developed countries,  3 percent in the centrally planned econo-
mies  and over  6  percent  in the developing  economies  increased  de-
mand for agricultural  products (Executive  Office of the President, p.
378).
The  United States, being the residual supplier  in the world mar-
ket, benefited  most from these salubrious  conditions.  With  a cheap
dollar,  competitive  prices,  large tracts  of land  in acreage  reduction
programs  and  huge  stocks,  the  United  States  could  respond  more
rapidly than its competitors  to the increase  in  demand for  agricul-
tural products.
With the export  boom,  low  interest rates and high inflation,  land
values soared.  Between  1977  and 1981 the value of farm real estate
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1985,  p.  6).  On the strength  of an  economic  anomaly,  bankers lent
and farmers borrowed against their land to invest in more land and
machinery.  And  farmers  increased their production  to fill  what ev-
eryone predicted would be an ever growing  world demand.
With between  40 and 60 percent of corn  and wheat farmer's  cash
receipts  coming  from  exports,  many  farmers  depended  heavily  on
those exports to repay their loans (Sanderson). But unfortunately the
conditions that fed the boom no longer existed by the first half of the
1980s.
Between  1960  and 1985,  worldwide  agricultural  production  of the
major food and feedgrains (wheat, rice and coarse grains) almost dou-
bled, from 846 million metric tons to 1,642  million metric tons. Over
that same period, the volume of world grain trade has expanded two
and a half times, from 72  million metric tons to 180 million metric
tons (Rossmiller et al  1986, p.  79).
Over those years, a number of countries joined the United States as
agricultural exporters.  For example,  in 1960 the European Commu-
nity (EC) and India were net wheat importers; by 1985, both were net
exporters.  Argentina  increased its wheat exports  from almost noth-
ing in 1960 to 9.4 million metric tons in 1984. Over that same period,
Canada's wheat exports doubled and Australia's exports  almost tri-
pled.  A similar story can be told for  soybeans,  corn and  other com-
modities.  There  are a number of other competitors  out there in the
1980s  vying  for markets  the  United  States  called  its  own  in  the
1950s,  '60s and '70s.
In  late  1981  the  macroeconomic  conditions  that had  thrust  U.S.
exports upwards reversed to send exports into a sharp decline.  When
OPEC again upped the price of oil, the United States faced unaccept-
able  double-digit  inflation.  The  Federal  Reserve  responded  with  a
contractionary monetary policy designed to wring inflation out of the
economy.  At the  same  time, the U.S.  administration  and  Congress
began to run an expansionary  fiscal policy.  This combination raised
interest rates and attracted foreign capital to the United States.  Con-
sequently, between  1980 and 1985,  the value of the dollar rose by  60
percent against the currencies of U.S. trading partners, making U.S.
agricultural exports expensive.
The high interest rates and consequent  overvalued dollar hindered
U.S.  exports  more  through their  impact  on the  international  econ-
omy  than through their  impact  on  agricultural  prices per  se.  The
contractionary monetary  policies of the United States (and other de-
veloped  countries which were  forced to follow suit) provoked  a reces-
sion that dampened  demand worldwide.
High interest rates and expensive  dollars damaged the economies
of developing countries which had incurred dollar denominated debt
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ing and Eastern  Bloc debtors faced a total debt of about $450 billion
and net interest payments of $42 billion. Many countries were forced
to reschedule  their debts and undergo  IMF  austerity programs. Un-
der those programs  countries were required to reduce their imports.
After  making their payments  they had  little foreign  exchange  left
over to buy U.S. wheat and corn. For example, Mexico,  after increas-
ing its imports from the United States by  35  percent  between  1980
and 1981,  decreased its imports by 45 percent in 1982,  the first year
of the debt crisis. Similarly, Brazil's imports rose 19 percent between
1980  and  1981,  then fell  31  percent the  following  year (Rossmiller
and Tutwiler  1986a).  As the economic reversal took hold, U.S.  agri-
cultural  exports  dropped by $4.7  billion in 1982 and have continued
down through  the  1986 estimates at  an annual  rate of $1.6 billion
(Rossmiller  1986a,  pp. 24-25).
U.S.  agricultural  policy  in the early  1980s  did  not help  matters.
The  1981  farm  bill  incorporated  a  schedule  of increasing  support
prices  predicated  on  expectations  of  double-digit  inflation.  While
double-digit inflation did not materialize, increases in support prices
did.  When  combined with the high dollar,  U.S.  policies  priced  U.S.
agriculture  out of the world market.
At the same time these policies hurt U.S. exports,  they helped our
competitors.  High  U.S.  prices  encouraged  countries  like  Argentina
and Brazil  to expand  their exports.  High U.S.  prices and the dollar
lowered  Europe's restitution  costs and probably allowed them to ex-
port more than they might have otherwise.  U.S. exports of wheat fell
9.3 million metric tons between 1981 and 1984 while its competitors'
exports  increased  by  10.5 million  metric tons. Half of those exports
came from developed country competition; half from Argentina (Ross-
miller and Tutwiler  1986b, p. 4). Playing the unenviable role of the
residual adjustor  in a declining market, the United States could not
adjust quickly to the downturn in demand and lost market share.
Macroeconomy  Will Not Bail Out U.S.  Agriculture
The macroeconomic  and agricultural crises have fundamentally  al-
tered the economic  and policy environment.  Unfortunately, as we go
into the next GATT round, the macroeconomy and agricultural policy
are still reeling from the changes. And in some cases not enough has
changed and some  of the changes have done more harm than good.
Since  central  bankers  from  France,  Germany,  Japan,  the  United
Kingdom and the United States (the Group of Five) met in New York
City in November,  1985, the United States and other developed coun-
tries have moved to push the dollar  down. The fall in the dollar will
boost exports, but not as much as some would hope.
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in  the  early  1980s  was  important,  its effect  varied  and  was  often
exaggerated.  For example, the price of U.S.  soybeans in terms of Eu-
ropean currencies  rose  70  percent.  However the price  of wheat and
corn  were  unaffected  by  the  value  of the  dollar  because  for  these
commodities  the European  Community  fixes  domestic  agricultural
prices using the  variable  levy  system  of the  Common Agricultural
Policy. The price of soybeans to Japan rose 25 percent, while the price
of U.S.  commodities to many developing countries  did not change at
all because their exchange rates are tied to the dollar (Sanderson, p.
4).
Similarly, expectations that the drop in the value of the dollar will
be the panacea  to boost exports  are  ill-founded.  While  the value  of
the dollar has fallen 30 percent on average, it has not fallen against
the currencies  of some  of our major competitors  or of our major im-
porters.  As  is  widely  publicized,  from  its  March  1985  peak,  the
dollar  has  depreciated  most  against  the  European  currencies-
approximately  30 percent. But from its average  1984 value (a better
estimate of the dollar's true price  in the first half of the decade) the
U.S. dollar has actually  risen 6.4 percent against the Canadian  dol-
lar and is also up against the Mexican peso by 20  percent. The U.S.
dollar is also higher,  in real terms, against the currencies  of South
Korea,  Taiwan, Hong  Kong,  Brazil, Australia  and Argentina. While
the lower dollar is bound to help agricultural exports, it will not do so
quickly (Rossmiller and Tutwiler  1986b, p.  5).
Much  of the  dollar's  decline  has  been  induced  by  a  fall  in  U.S.
interest  rates.  Lower  interest  rates  will  help  agriculture  on  two
fronts. Domestically,  lower interest rates will-eventually-translate
into lower  debt payments for  farmers.  (Although this effect may  be
delayed  since banks  are  somewhat skittish about  lending money  to
agriculture  at present.)  Lower  interest  rates  will  also  mean  lower
debt  payments  for  developing  countries which  should  free up  some
exchange  for increased agricultural  imports.
But, even with lower payments, U.S. farmers  and debtor countries
are  still staggering  under huge  debt burdens.  As of January,  1985,
farm debt totaled $212 billion, with 17 percent of farmers considered
to be in severe financial stress (U.S. Department of Agriculture  1985,
p.  18). In 1984 (the latest year for which figures are available) devel-
oping country debt  totaled between  $812  and $843  billion, equal to
about one third of their GNP (Executive  Office of the President, U.S.
Trade Representative,  p.  12). The former are still financially  stressed
and the latter  are unable to substantially  boost their imports  from
the United States.
In addition to a cheaper  dollar and lower interest rates, U.S.  agri-
cultural policy has substantially decreased  support prices. While the
1985 Food Security Act represents no wholesale changes in U.S. farm
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products  more  competitive  on  the  world  market.  Loan  rates  have
been lowered  dramatically and future loan rates will be determined
according to competitive  demands in the world markets, rather than
by a purely domestic formula. The farm bill also lowers export prices
through export credits and marketing loans.
These  lower  prices  will translate  into  increased  exports,  but  not
before the next election.  Unwilling to wait, impatient  policymakers
and politicians have negotiated subsidized sales of wheat to the Sovi-
ets  and sugar  to the Chinese  in an  effort  to increase  exports  more
immediately.  While these sales  may give exports a  visible and sud-
den boost, they have been met with hostility by our competitors.
There  is evidence  to  suggest that  in the short run-and  perhaps
even  in the long run-our competitors  will follow  U.S. prices  down-
ward,  taking most of the  punch out of lower  U.S.  prices.  This  past
spring the National Center for Food  and Agricultural Policy was in-
volved in a project to evaluate how U.S. competitors would respond to
export  subsidies  and  lower  prices  (Rossmiller  1986b).  Government
officials  in Argentina,  Brazil,  Australia,  Canada and the  European
Community  confirmed  that they will  meet  U.S.  prices,  passively  or
aggressively.
In the short run, Argentina will export regardless  of the interna-
tional price because of inadequate  storage capacity.  Over the longer
term, Argentina  will  export  because  the  country  needs  foreign  ex-
change to repay  its international  debt.  Argentina's recent moves  to
lower agricultural export taxes and to devalue its currency indicate a
willingness to change policy to maintain agricultural  exports.  And,
to the extent that the country can reduce taxes further and improve
agricultural  infrastructure,  Argentina  can  follow  U.S.  prices  down
quite far.  In April,  1986, when U.S. farmers received  $90 per metric
ton of corn, Argentine farmers received $36 per metric ton.
Brazil has been increasing soybean production and crushing capac-
ity since the late  1970s and can now produce soybean oil in excess of
domestic  requirements.  While  Brazil  consumes  about 90 percent  of
the soy oil produced, it consumes about 25 percent of the soymeal by-
product. Brazilian export policy is dominated by concern over domes-
tic  vegetable  oil  prices.  So,  in  the  short  term,  Brazil  will  export
excess supplies of soy oil and soy meal regardless of the international
price.  In the longer term, Brazilian  soybean production would be ex-
pected to decline to the point at which only enough oil is produced for
domestic  consumption.  Excess  soymeal  would  continue  to  be  ex-
ported.  Resources  shifted  out  of  soybean  production  would  most
likely move  into the production  of foodstuffs  such  as fruit that are
currently imported.
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attempt to boost prices. But during the  1980s, the Australian Wheat
Board was compelled to alter its method of operation  with significant
implications for the country's international  market behavior.  Forced
by the  thinness of Australian capital  markets to  finance  its  opera-
tions  in  the  international  capital  market,  the  Australian  Wheat
Board quickly  came  to appreciate  the time value  of money  and the
high  costs  of stock  holding.  When  the  Australian  drought  signifi-
cantly  reduced  exports  in  1980,  and  Australia  saw  no  discernable
effect on world prices, the board reasoned the reverse would hold and
Australia became  a non price-responsive  seller.  So, in the short term
Australia will not reduce its exports in response to lower U.S. prices.
In the longer term, lower world prices would likely cause exports and
production  to  shrink.  But  production  alternatives  in  Australia  are
limited to sheep  and wheat  so production  adjustments  would occur
mainly through  reduced fertilizer  and pesticide applications.
In the  late  1970s,  Canada  made  significant  investments  in  west
coast  port capacity  and rail  transport  in  order  to expand  exports.
Also, to stress their commitment as a reliable supplier, the Canadian
Wheat  Board has negotiated  long-term  supply agreements  covering
80 to 90 percent of Canada's wheat export sales. The Canadians have
both  a commitment  and an obligation to maintain exports.  The Ca-
nadian reaction to the lower loan rates in the 1985  Food Security Act
is instructive:  the Wheat Board lowered  initial prices by  19 percent
for  1986 and planting intentions rose, however  slightly. In the longer
term,  lower  loan  rates  and  lower  world  prices  will  diminish  farm
income.  Should  the  Canadian  government  choose  to  support  farm
income, exports will not drop and could increase.  Should the govern-
ment choose  not to  support farm  incomes,  land values could  be  ex-
pected  to  deflate,  lowering  production  costs  and  maintaining
Canadian  competitiveness.  Finally,  the  Canadian  Wheat  Board  is
completely  flexible  on  individual  sales,  and  is therefore  capable  of
meeting U.S. prices market by  market.
The EC  is also unlikely to be undersold.  It can set export restitu-
tions quickly  and easily, market  by market,  to remain  competitive.
And rhetoric aside, there is no budget constraint  on the Community
when it comes to keeping its export markets.  Europe sees the lower
loan rates and the targeted  export programs  as predatory  and will
raise  revenue  through  supplemental  appropriations  if necessary  to
counter what they  consider  to be  aggressive  U.S.  policies.  So,  even
though the cheaper  dollar and the  lower loan rates have raised the
cost of the EC's export restitutions,  the Community stands ready  to
match U.S. prices.
In the next few months these subsidized sales will cause exports to
blip upward, but over the next year our competitors will meet or beat
U.S.  prices to maintain  or increase  their own  exports.  However,  the
fact remains that subsidies-whoever  pays them-will  not solve  the
43problem  as long as there  is too much grain in the world and too few
buyers.
Wheat and coarse  grain supplies are expected to exceed  1.6 billion
tons,  25  percent  more  than  world  demand  and  nearly  double  the
amount that supply has usually  exceeded demand.  Ending stocks in
the United  States for  1985-86  are estimated  to  account  for  95  per-
cent  of total  wheat  demand,  and  50  percent  of  corn  demand  (U.S.
Department of Agriculture  1986).
And there is little to suggest that they will diminish in the medium
to longer  term.  A recent  report  by the  Office  of Technology  Assess-
ment  predicts that  new  technologies  will  boost  the  annual  rate  of
growth  in milk production  from 2.6  percent  to 3.9  percent  by  2000
(U.S. Congress). Increases  in crop production will not be as dramatic,
but corn yields could increase from 113 bushels per acre in 1982 to as
much  as  150  bushels  per  acre  by  the  year  2000.  Similarly,  wheat
yields are  predicted  to rise from  36 bushels  per acre  to 45  bushels.
And this is just in the United States. With the recent performance  of
India and China  as  examples,  there  is  little reason  to doubt that  a
number  of developing  countries will be able to significantly  expand
their production.
If a glut is to be avoided,  demand must increase.  But the prospects
for growth high enough to solve the problem  are dim.  Growth  in the
United States and other developed  countries  has been sluggish. The
drop in the value  of the dollar  has damaged the Japanese  economy
and is hurting the exporting sectors  of the European  economy. And
while  the  lower  dollar  bodes well  for  debt  burdened  less  developed
countries,  it could  harm those  who rely  on  exports.  Fears of rekin-
dling an inflation that is seemingly  slumbering in the wake of recent
cuts  in the  discount  rate  will  probably  prevent  governments  from
aggressively pursuing growth regardless of the effect on prices.
As exports increase slowly in the face of sluggish  growth and as our
competitors  fight  to  keep their  markets,  what  will  be  the  United
States'  response?  More  subsidized  sales  could be  one  solution.  But
such subsidies will increase exports only as long as the U.S. Treasury
can  outbid competitors'  treasuries  and  will only  exacerbate  current
tensions  making  it more  difficult to  put agriculture  on  the  GATT
agenda.  Alternatively,  the United States could turn its back on the
world market  by  raising support prices.  Ignoring  the world  market
would mean idling up to half of our acreage  which would allow our
current competitors  (and others we haven't even  heard  of yet) to in-
crease their  production  and exports  and would  decrease  incentives
for the U.S. farmer to continue to produce at low costs.  GATT would
be a moot point.
Clearly, agricultural  negotiations  in the GATT  are critical  for the
United States. We cannot expect the macroeconomy to bail us out of
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But even more clearly, in the present climate, those negotiations will
be hard to start much less conduct.  How can the United States  im-
prove  the negotiating  climate  and what should  our  strategy  be  to-
wards those negotiations.
What Is to be Done?
The  administration  has several  goals  for agriculture  in the  GATT
round, including putting agriculture  on a more  market-oriented ba-
sis by eliminating  export subsidies and by reducing barriers  to im-
port. These  are admirable  goals  as far  as they  go, but we must be
more specific.
Currently,  the  United  States  operates  under  one  set  of trading
rules while other  countries operate  under another  set.  The Section
22 waiver,  which allows  the United States to impose  import  quotas
when imports threaten the government's ability to conduct  domestic
programs,  is one  such rule.  To be  considered  seriously,  we must be
willing to put our Section 22 waiver on the table at GATT, even if we
receive nothing directly in return.
Further,  we  must  be  willing  to  discuss  domestic  policies.  GATT
rules presently discourage export subsidies for primary products,  ex-
cept  in certain  circumstances.  But  there is widespread  recognition
that  many  countries  use  domestic  policies  to  directly  subsidize
farmers  and  thereby  indirectly  subsidize  exports.  All  agricultural
subsidies-export  and domestic-need to be included in GATT discus-
sions because  they  all have an  impact on trade.  Unless the United
States  and  other  major  agricultural  producers  are  willing  to  talk
about harmonizing or coordinating domestic policy sets, negotiations
will be meaningless.
Finally,  it is important that Congress  doesn't tie the hands of the
negotiators (Hathaway).  We  cannot  afford  to exclude  discussions  of
Section 22 and domestic policies  in advance.  Excluding these issues
will please those countries that want negotiations to fail. Those coun-
tries could use U.S.  intransigence  as an excuse  not to participate  in
the  negotiations,  thereby  dooming  negotiations  and  hopes  for  a
stronger recovery for U.S.  agriculture.
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